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Abstract
In this paper, we study the distribution of the number of internal equilibria of a multi-
player two-strategy random evolutionary game. Using techniques from the random polynomial
theory, we obtain a closed formula for the probability that the game has a certain number of
internal equilibria. In addition, by employing Descartes’ rule of signs and combinatorial meth-
ods, we provide useful estimates for this probability. Finally, we also compare our analytical
results with those obtained from samplings.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) [MSP73] has become one of the most diverse and far reach-
ing theories in biology finding applications in a plethora of disciplines such as ecology, population
genetics, social sciences, economics and computer science [MS82, Axe84, HS98, Now06, BR13,
PS10, San10, HPL17]. For example, in economics, EGT has been employed to make predictions
in situations where traditional assumptions about agents’ rationality and knowledge may not be
justified [Fri98, San10]. In computer science, EGT has been used extensively to model dynamics
and emergent behaviour in multiagent systems [TP07, Han13]. Furthermore, EGT has provided
explanations for the basic of cooperative behaviours which is one of the most well-studied and
challenging interdisciplinary problems in science [Pen05, HS98, Now06]. Of particular importance
subclass in EGT is random evolutionary games in which the payoff entries are random variables.
They are useful to model social and biological systems in which very limited information is avail-
able, or where the environment changes so rapidly and frequently that one cannot predict the
payoffs of their inhabitants [May01, FH92, HTG12, GRLD09]. In addition, as argued in [GF13],
even when random games are not directly representative for real world scenarios, they are valuable
as a null hypothesis that can be used to sharpen our understanding of what makes real games
special.
Similar to the foundational concept of Nash equilibrium in classical game theory [Nas50], the
analysis of equilibrium points is of great importance in evolutionary game theory providing essen-
tial implications for understanding of complexity in a dynamical system, such as its behavioural,
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2cultural or biological diversity [BCV97, Bro03, GT10, HTG12, GT14, DH15, DH16, BR16]. There
are a considerable number of papers in the literature that study the number of equilibria, their sta-
bility and attainability in concrete strategic scenarios such as public goods games, see for example
[BCV97, Bro00, PSSS09, SPS09, SCP15]. However, despite its importance, equilibrium properties
in random games is far less understood with, to the best of our knowledge, only a few recent efforts
[GT10, HTG12, GF13, GT14, DH15, DH16, BR16]. One of the most challenging problems in the
study of equilibrium properties in random games is to characterise the distribution of the number
of equilibria [GT10, HTG12]
Can one compute the distribution of the number of (internal) equilibria in a d-player two-strategy
random evolutionary game?
In this paper, we address this question by providing closed formulas for the probability pm (0 ≤
m ≤ d− 1)that a d-player two strategy game has m internal equilibria.
Using the replicator dynamics approach, to find an internal equilibrium in a d-player two-
strategy game, one needs to solve the following polynomial equation for y > 0 (see Equation (5)
and its derivation in Section 2),
P (y) :=
d−1∑
k=0
βk
(
d− 1
k
)
yk = 0, (1)
where βk = ak−bk, with ak and bk being random variables representing the entries of the game pay-
off matrix. In [GT10, HTG12, GT14], the authors provide both numerical and analytical results for
games with a small number of players (d ≤ 4), focusing on the probability of attaining a maximal
number of equilibrium points. These works use a direct approach by solving Equation (1), ex-
pressing the positivity of its zeros as domains of conditions for the coefficients and then integrating
over these domains to obtain the corresponding probabilities. However, in general, a polynomial of
degree five or higher is not analytically solvable [Abe24]. Therefore, it is impossible to extend the
direct approach to the case of large number of players. In recent works [DH15, DH16, DTH17a] we
have developed links between random evolutionary games and random polynomial theory [EK95]
as well as the classical polynomial theory (particularly Legendre polynomials) employing tech-
niques from the latter to study the expected number, E =
∑d−1
m=0mpm, of internal equilibria. More
specifically, we provided closed formulas for E, characterized its asymptotic limits as d tends to
infinity and investigated the effect of correlation in the case of correlated payoff entries. The
derivation of the individual probabilities pm (0 ≤ m ≤ d− 1) is harder than that of the expecta-
tion; however, it will provide more insights into the understanding of the equilibrium properties of
the game such as the probabilities of having no/unique/maximal number of internal equilibria. In
this paper we explore deeper links between random polynomial theory and random evolutionary
game theory.
1.2 Summary of main results
We now summarize our main results. Detailed statements and proofs will be given in the
sequel sections. The first main result of the paper is explicit formulas for the distribution of the
number of internal equilibria.
Theorem 1.1 (The distribution of the number of internal equilibria in a d-player two-strategy
random evolutionary game). Suppose that the coefficients {βk} in (1) are either normally dis-
tributed or uniformly distributed or being the difference of uniformly distributed random variables.
The probability that a d-player two-strategy random evolutionary game has m, 0 ≤ m ≤ d − 1,
internal equilibria, is given by
pm =
b d−1−m2 c∑
k=0
pm,2k,d−1−m−2k, (2)
3where pm,2k,d−1−m−2k are given in (19)-(20)-(21) respectively.
In Section 3, we will derive Theorem 1.1 from a more general theorem, Theorem 3.1, where
we provide explicit formulas for the probability pm,2k,n−m−2k that a random polynomial or degree
n has m (0 ≤ m ≤ n) positive, 2k (0 ≤ k ≤ bn−m2 c) complex and n − 2m − 2k negative roots.
We expect that Theorem 3.1 is also useful in a more general context in the random polynomial
theory.
Theorem 1.1 is theoretically interesting; however, to obtain pm one needs to calculate all the
probabilities pm,2k,d−1−2k, 0 ≤ k ≤ bn−m2 c, which are complex multiple integrals. In Section 5 we
do compute all the probabilities pm, 0 ≤ m ≤ d− 1, for d is up to 5 and compare the result with
the sampling method. When d is larger it becomes computationally expensive to compute these
probabilities using formula (2). Our second main result offers simpler explicit estimates of pm in
terms of d and m. It turns out that the symmetry of the coefficients βk plays a significant role.
We consider two cases
Case 1 : P(βk > 0) = P(βk < 0) =
1
2
and Case 2 : P(βk > 0) = P(βk < 0) = α
for all k = 0, . . . , d− 1 and for some 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Case 1 is obviously a particular instance of Case 2
when α = 12 ; however, due to its special symmetric property, we will provide a much more simpler
treatment for Case 1 than the general one.
Theorem 1.2. We have the following estimates for pm
pm ≤
∑
k≥m
k−m even
pk,d−1, (3)
where pk,d−1 = 12d−1
(
d− 1
k
)
if α = 12 , in this case the sum on the right hand side of (3) can be
computed explicitly in terms of m and d, and can be computed explicitly according to Theorem 4.10
for the general case. Estimate (3) has several interesting consequences such as explicit bounds for
pd−2 and pd−1 as well as the following assertions
1) For d = 2: p0 = α
2 + (1− α)2 and p1 = 2α(1− α);
2) For d = 3: p1 = 2α(1− α).
We will derive Theorem 1.2 in Section 4 from Descartes’ rule of signs applied to random
polynomials and combinatorial techniques. Our technique can be used to obtain estimates for the
probability that a random polynomial has a certain number of positive roots which is an interesting
problem on its own right.
1.3 Organisation of the paper
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we summarize the replicator
dynamics for multi-player two-strategy games. Section 3 is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1.1
on the probability distribution. The proof of Theorem 1.2 will be given in Section 4. In Section 5
we show some numerical simulations to demonstrate analytical results. Finally, further discussions
are given in Section 6.
2 Replicator dynamics
A fundamental model of evolutionary game theory is replicator dynamics [TJ78, Zee80, HS98,
SS83, Now06], describing that whenever a strategy has a fitness larger than the average fitness
4of the population, it is expected to spread. For the sake of completeness, below we derive the
replicator dynamics for multi-player two-strategy games.
Consider an infinitely large population with two strategies, A and B. Let x, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, be
the frequency of strategy A. The frequency of strategy B is thus (1 − x). The interaction of the
individuals in the population is in randomly selected groups of d participants, that is, they play
and obtain their fitness from d-player games. The game is defined through a (d− 1)-dimensional
payoff matrix [GT10], as follows. Let ak (resp., bk) be the payoff of an A-strategist (resp., B) in a
group containing k A strategists (i.e. d − k B strategists). In this paper, we consider symmetric
games where the payoffs do not depend on the ordering of the players. Asymmetric games will
be studied in our forthcoming paper [DTH17b]. In the symmetric case, the probability that an A
strategist interacts with k other A strategists in a group of size d is(
d− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)d−1−k. (4)
Thus, the average payoffs of A and B are, respectively
piA =
d−1∑
k=0
ak
(
d− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)d−1−k, piB =
d−1∑
k=0
bk
(
d− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)d−1−k.
The replicator equation of a d-player two-strategy game is given by [HS98, Sig10, GT10]
x˙ = x(1− x)(piA − piB).
Since x = 0 and x = 1 are two trivial equilibrium points, we focus only on internal ones, i.e.
0 < x < 1. They satisfy the condition that the fitnesses of both strategies are the same piA = piB ,
which gives rise to
d−1∑
k=0
βk
(
d− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)d−1−k = 0,
where βk = ak − bk. Using the transformation y = x1−x , with 0 < y < +∞, dividing the left hand
side of the above equation by (1− x)d−1 we obtain the following polynomial equation for y
P (y) :=
d−1∑
k=0
βk
(
d− 1
k
)
yk = 0. (5)
Note that this equation can also be derived from the definition of an evolutionary stable strategy,
see e.g., [BCV97]. As in [GT10, DH15, DH16], we are interested in random games where ak and
bk (thus βk), for 0 ≤ k ≤ d− 1, are random variables.
In Section 3 where we provide estimates for the number of internal equilibria in a d-player
two-strategy game, we will use the information on the symmetry of βk. The following lemma gives
a necessary condition to determine when the difference of two random variables is symmetrically
distributed.
Lemma 2.1. [DTH17a, Lemma 3.5] Let X and Y be two exchangeable random variables, i.e. their
joint probability distribution fX,Y (x, y) is symmetric, fX,Y (x, y) = fX,Y (y, x). Then Z = X − Y
is symmetrically distributed about 0, i.e., its probability distribution satisfies fZ(z) = fZ(−z). In
addition, if X and Y are iid then they are exchangeable.
3 The distribution of the number of positive zeros of ran-
dom polynomial and applications to EGT
In this section, we are interested in finding the distribution of the number of internal equilibria
of a d-player two-strategy random evolutionary game. We recall that an internal equilibria is a
5real and positive zero of the polynomial P (y) in (5)
P (y) :=
d−1∑
k=0
βk
(
d− 1
k
)
yk = 0. (6)
Denote by κ the number of positive zeros of this polynomial. For a given m, 0 ≤ m ≤ d − 1, we
need to compute the probability pm that κ = m. To this end, we first adapt a recent method
introduced in [Zap06] (see also [BZ17, GKZ17] for its applications to other problems) to establish
a formula to compute the probability that a general random polynomial has a given number of
real and positive zeros. Then we apply the general theory to the polynomial (6) above.
3.1 The distribution of the number of positive zeros of a random poly-
nomials
Consider a general random polynomial
P(t) = ξ0t
n + ξ1t
n−1 + . . .+ ξn−1t+ ξn. (7)
We use the following notations for the elementary symmetric polynomials
σ0(y1, . . . , yn) = 1,
σ1(y1, . . . , yn) = y1 + . . .+ yn,
σ2(y1, . . . , yn) = y1y2 + . . .+ yn−1yn (8)
...
σn−1(y1, . . . , yn) = y1y2 . . . yn−1 + . . .+ y2y3 . . . yn,
σn(y1, . . . , yn) = y1 . . . yn;
and denote
∆(y1, . . . , yn) =
∏
1≤i<j≤n
|yi − yj |. (9)
the Vandermonde determinant.
Theorem 3.1. Assume that the random variables ξ0, ξ1, . . . , ξn have a joint density p(a0, . . . , an).
Let 0 ≤ m ≤ d− 1 and 0 ≤ k ≤ bn−m2 c. The probability pm,2k,n−m−2k that P has m positive, 2k
complex and n−m− 2k negative zeros is given by
pm,2k,n−m−2k =
2k
m!k!(n−m− 2k)!
∫
Rm+
∫
Rn−m−2k−
∫
Rk+
∫
[0,pi]k
∫
R
r1 . . . rkp(aσ0, . . . , aσn)|an∆| da dα1 . . . dαkdr1 . . . drkdx1 . . . dxn−2k, (10)
where
σj = σj(x1, . . . , xn−2k, r1eiα1 , r1e−iα1 , . . . , rkeiαk , rke−iαk), (11)
∆ = ∆(x1, . . . , xn−2k, r1eiα1 , r1e−iα1 , . . . , rkeiαk , rke−iαk). (12)
As consequences,
(1) The probability that P has m positive zeros is
pm =
bn−m2 c∑
k=0
pm,2k,n−m−2k. (13)
6(2) In particular, the probability that P has the maximal number of positive zeros is
pn =
2k
k!(n− 2k)!
∫
Rn+
∫
R
p(aσ0, . . . , aσn) |an ∆| dadx1 . . . dxn, (14)
where
σj = σj(x1, . . . , xn), ∆ = ∆(x1, . . . , xn).
Proof. The reference [Zap06, Theorem 1] provides a formula to compute the probability that the
polynomial P has n− 2k real and 2k complex roots. In the present paper, we need to distinguish
between positive and negative real zeros. We now sketch and adapt the proof of [Zap06, Theorem
1] to obtain the formula (10) for the probability that the polynomial P has m positive, 2k complex
and n−m− 2k negative roots. Consider a (n+ 1)-dimensional vector space V of polynomials of
the form
Q(t) = a0t
n + a1t
n−1 + . . .+ an−1t+ an
and a measure µ on this space defined as the integral of the differential form
dQ = p(a0, . . . , an) da0 ∧ . . . ∧ dan. (15)
Our goal is to find µ(Vm,2k) where Vm,2k is the set of polynomials having m positive, 2k complex
and n−m− 2k negative roots. Let Q ∈ Vm,2k. Denote all zeros of Q as
z1 = x1, . . . , zn−2k = xn−2k, zn−2k+1 = r1eiα1 , zn−2k+2 = r1e−iα1 , . . . , zn−1 = rkeiαk , zn = rke−iαk ,
where
0 < x1, . . . , xm <∞; −∞ < xm+1, . . . , xn−2k < 0; 0 < r1, . . . , rk <∞; 0 < α1, . . . , αk < pi.
To find µ(Vm,2k) we need to integrate the differential form (15) over the set Vm,2k. The key
idea in the proof of [Zap06, Theorem 1] is to make a change of coordinates (a0, . . . , an) 7→
(a0, x1, . . . , xn−2k, r1, . . . , rk, α1, . . . , αk) and find dQ in the new coordinates. The derivation of
the following formula is carried out in detail in [Zap06, Theorem 1]:
dQ = 2kr1 . . . rk p(a0, a0σ1(x1, . . . , xn−2k, r1eiα1 , r1e−iα1 , . . . , rkeiαk , rke−iαk), . . .
a0σn(x1, . . . , xn−2k, r1eiα1 , r1e−iα1 , . . . , rkeiαk , rke−iαk))
× |an0∆((x1, . . . , xn−2k, r1eiα1 , r1e−iα1 , . . . , rkeiαk , rke−iαk))|
× dx1 ∧ . . . ∧ dxn−2k ∧ dr1 ∧ . . . ∧ drk ∧ dα1 ∧ . . . ∧ dαk ∧ da0. (16)
Now we integrate this equation over all polynomials Q that have m positive zeros, n − m − 2k
negative zeros and k complex zeros in the upper half-plane. Since there are m! permutations of
the positive zeros, (n −m − 2k)! permutations of the negative zeros, and k! permutations of the
complex zeros, after integrating each polynomial in the left-hand side will occur m!k!(n−m−2k)!
times. Hence the integral of the left-hand side is equal to m!k!(n −m − 2k)! pm,2k,n−m−2k. The
integral on the right-hand side equals
2k
∫
Rm+
∫
Rn−m−2k−
∫
Rk+
∫
[0,pi]k
∫
R
r1 . . . rkp(aσ0, . . . , aσn)|an∆| da dα1 . . . dαkdr1 . . . drkdx1 . . . dxn−2k,
(17)
hence the assertion (10) follows.
73.2 The distribution of the number of internal equilibria
Next we apply Theorem 3.1 to compute the probability that a random evolutionary game
has m, 0 ≤ m ≤ d − 1, internal equilibria. We derive formulas for the most three common cases
[HTG12]:
C1) {βj , 0 ≤ j ≤ d− 1} are i.i.d. standard normally distributed,
C2) {βj} are i.i.d uniformly distributed with the common distribution fj(x) = 121[−1,1](x),
C3) {ak} and {bk} are i.i.d uniformly distributed with the common distribution fj(x) = 121[−1,1](x).
The main result of this section is the following theorem (cf. Theorem 1.2).
Theorem 3.2. The probability that a d-player two-strategy random evolutionary game has m
(0 ≤ m ≤ d− 1) internal equilibria is
pm =
b d−1−m2 c∑
k=0
pm,2k,d−1−m−2k, (18)
where pm,2k,d−1−m−2k is given below for each of the case above:
- for the case C1)
pm,2k,d−1−m−2k
=
2k
m!k!(d− 1−m− 2k)!
Γ
(
d
2
)
(pi)
d
2
d−1∏
i=0
δi
∫
Rm+
∫
Rd−1−2k−m−
∫
Rk+
∫
[0,pi]k
r1 . . . rk
(
d−1∑
i=0
σ2i
δ2i
)− d2
∆
dα1 . . . dαkdr1 . . . drkdx1 . . . dxd−1−2k (19)
where σi, for i = 0, . . . , d− 1, and ∆ are given in (11)–(12) and δi =
(
d− 1
i
)
.
-for the case C2)
pm,2k,d−1−m−2k =
2k+1−d
dm! k! (d− 1−m− 2k)!
d−1∏
i=0
δi
∫
Rm+
∫
Rd−1−2k−m−
∫
Rk+
∫
[0,pi]k
r1 . . . rk
(
min
{|δi/σi|})d∆
dα1 . . . dαkdr1 . . . drkdx1 . . . dxd−1−2k. (20)
–for the case C3)
pm,2k,d−1−m−2k =
2k+1(−1)d
m!k!(d− 1−m− 2k)!∏d−1j=0 δ2j
∫
Rm+
∫
Rd−1−2k−m−
∫
Rk+
∫
[0,pi]k
r1 . . . rk
d−1∏
j=0
|σj |
d∑
i=0
(−1)i Ki
2d− i
(
min
{|δi/σi|})2d−i∆ dα1 . . . dαkdr1 . . . drkdx1 . . . dxd−1−2k.
(21)
In particular, the probability that a d-player two-strategy random evolutionary game has the
maximal number of internal equilibria is
1) for the case C1)
pd−1 =
1
(d− 1)!
Γ
(
d
2
)
(pi)
d
2
d−1∏
i=0
δi
∫
Rd−1+
q(σ0, . . . , σd−1) dx1 . . . dxd−1, (22)
82) for the case C2)
pd−1 =
21−d
d!
∏d−1
i=0 δi
∫
Rd−1+
(
min
{|δi/σi|})d∆ dx1 . . . dxd−1, (23)
3) for the case C3)
pd−1 =
2(−1)d
(d− 1)!∏d−1j=0 δ2j
∫
Rd−1+
d−1∏
j=0
|σj |
d∑
i=0
(−1)i Ki
2d− i
(
min
{|δi/σi|})2d−i∆ dx1 . . . dxd−1. (24)
Note that in formulas (22)-(24) above, σj = σj(x1, . . . , xd−1), ∆ = ∆(x1, . . . , xd−1).
Proof. 1) Since {βj , 0 ≤ j ≤ d− 1} are i.i.d. standard normally distributed and for i 6= j the joint
distribution p(y0, . . . , yd−1) of
{(
d− 1
j
)
βj , 0 ≤ j ≤ d− 1
}
is given by
p(y0, . . . , yd−1) =
1
(2pi)
d
2
∏d−1
i=0
(
d− 1
i
) exp
−12
d−1∑
i=0
y2i(
d− 1
i
)2
 = 1(2pi) d2 |C| 12 exp
[
− 1
2
yTC−1y
]
,
where y = [y0 y1 . . . yd−1]T and C is the covariance matrix
Cij =
(
d− 1
i
)(
d− 1
j
)
δij .
Therefore,
p(aσ0, . . . , aσd−1) =
1
(2pi)
d
2 |C| 12 exp
(
− a
2
2
σT C−1 σ
)
where σ = [σ0 σ1 . . . σd−1]T . (25)
Using the following formula for moments of a normal distribution,∫
R
|x|n exp (− αx2) dx = Γ(n+12 )
α
n+1
2
,
we compute
∫
R
|a|d−1 exp
(
− a
2
2
σT C−1 σ
)
da =
Γ
(
d
2
)
(
σT C−1σ
2
) d
2
=
2
d
2 Γ
(
d
2
)
(
σTC−1σ) d2 .
Applying Theorem 3.1 to the polynomial P given in (1) and using the above identity we obtain
pm,2k,d−1−m−2k =
2k
m!k!(d− 1−m− 2k)!
∫
Rm+
∫
Rd−1−2k−m−
∫
Rk+
∫
[0,pi]k
∫
R
r1 . . . rk p(aσ0, . . . , aσd−1)|a|d−1∆ da dα1 . . . dαkdr1 . . . drkdx1 . . . dxd−1−2k
=
2k
m!k!(d− 1−m− 2k)!
1
(2pi)
d
2 |C| 12 2
d
2 Γ
(d
2
) ∫
Rm+
∫
Rd−1−2k−m−
∫
Rk+
∫
[0,pi]k
r1 . . . rk
(
σTC−1σ)− d2 ∆ dα1 . . . dαkdr1 . . . drkdx1 . . . dxd−1−2k
=
2k
m!k!(d− 1−m− 2k)!
Γ
(
d
2
)
(pi)
d
2 |C| 12
∫
Rm+
∫
Rd−1−2k−m−
∫
Rk+
∫
[0,pi]k
r1 . . . rk
(
σTC−1σ)− d2 ∆ dα1 . . . dαkdr1 . . . drkdx1 . . . dxd−1−2k,
9which is the desired equality (19) by definition of C and q.
2) Now since {βj} are i.i.d uniformly distributed with the common distribution fj(x) =
1
21[−1,1](x), the joint distribution p(y0, . . . , yd−1) of
{(
d− 1
j
)
βj , 0 ≤ j ≤ d− 1
}
is given by
p(y0, . . . , yd−1) =
1
2d
∏d−1
i=0 δi
1×d−1i=0 [−δ,δi](y0, . . . , yd−1) where δi =
(
d− 1
i
)
.
Therefore,
p(aσ0, . . . , aσd−1) =
1
2d
∏d−1
i=0 δi
1×d−1i=0 [−δ,δi](aσ0, . . . , aσd−1).
Since 1×d−1i=0 [−δ,δi](aσ0, . . . , aσd−1) = 1 if and only if aσi ∈ [−δi, δi] for all i = 0, . . . , d− 1; i.e.,
a ∈
d−1⋂
i=0
[− |δi/σi|, |δi/σi|] = [−min{|δi/σi|},min{|δi/σi|}],
We compute
∫
R
|a|d−1p(aσ0, . . . , aσd−1) da = 1
2d
∏d−1
i=0 δi
∫ min{|δi/σi|}
−min
{
|δi/σi|
} |a|d−1 da = 1
d 2d−1
∏d−1
i=0 δi
(
min
{|δi/σi|})d.
Similarly as in the Gaussian case, using this identity and applying Theorem 3.1 we obtain
pm,2k,d−1−m−2k =
2k
m!k!(d− 1−m− 2k)!
∫
Rm+
∫
Rd−1−2k−m−
∫
Rk+
∫
[0,pi]k
∫
R
r1 . . . rk p(aσ0, . . . , aσd−1)|a|d−1∆ da dα1 . . . dαkdr1 . . . drkdx1 . . . dxd−1−2k
=
2k+1−d
dm! k! (d− 1−m− 2k)!∏d−1i=0 δi
∫
Rm+
∫
Rd−1−2k−m−
∫
Rk+
∫
[0,pi]k
r1 . . . rk
(
min
{|δi/σi|})d∆ da dα1 . . . dαkdr1 . . . drkdx1 . . . dxd−1−2k.
3) Now we assume that aj and bj are i.i.d uniformly distributed with the common distribution
γ(x) = 121[−1,1](x). Since βj = aj − bj , its probability density is given by
γβ(x) =
∫ +∞
−∞
f(y)f(x+ y) dy = (1− |x|)1[−1,1](x).
The probability density of δjβj is
γj(x) =
1
δj
(
1− |x|
δj
)
1[−1,1](x/δj) =
δj − |x|
δ2j
1[−δj ,δj ](x),
and the joint distribution p(y0, . . . , yd−1) of {δjβj , 0 ≤ j ≤ d− 1} is given by
p(y0, . . . , yd−1) =
d−1∏
j=0
δj − |yj |
δ2j
1×d−1i=0 [−δi,δi](y0, . . . , yd−1).
Therefore
p(aσ0, . . . , aσd−1) =
d−1∏
j=0
δj − |aσj |
δ2j
1×d−1i=0 [−δi,δi](aσ0, . . . , aσd−1).
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We compute
∫
R
|a|d−1p(aσ0, . . . , aσd−1) da = 1∏d−1
j=0 δ
2
j
∫ min{|δi/σi|}
−min
{
|δi/σi|
} |a|d−1 d−1∏
j=0
(δj − |aσj |) da
=
2∏d−1
j=0 δ
2
j
∫ min{|δi/σi|}
0
ad−1
d−1∏
j=0
(δj − a|σj |) da
= 2(−1)d
d−1∏
j=0
|σj |
δ2j
∫ min{|δi/σi|}
0
ad−1
d−1∏
j=0
(
a− δj|σj |
)
da
= 2(−1)d
d−1∏
j=0
|σj |
δ2j
d∑
i=0
(−1)iKi
∫ min{|δi/σi|}
0
a2d−1−i da
= 2(−1)d
d−1∏
j=0
|σj |
δ2j
d∑
i=0
(−1)i Ki
2d− i
(
min
{|δi/σi|})2d−i
where Ki = σi(δ0/|σ0|, . . . , δd−1/|σd−1|) for i = 0, . . . , d.
Therefore,
pm,2k,d−1−m−2k
=
2k
m!k!(d− 1−m− 2k)!
∫
Rm+
∫
Rd−1−2k−m−
∫
Rk+
∫
[0,pi]k
∫
R
r1 . . . rk p(aσ0, . . . , aσd−1)|a|d−1∆ da dα1 . . . dαkdr1 . . . drkdx1 . . . dxd−1−2k
=
2k+1(−1)d
m!k!(d− 1−m− 2k)!∏d−1j=0 δ2j
∫
Rm+
∫
Rd−1−2k−m−
∫
Rk+
∫
[0,pi]k
r1 . . . rk
d−1∏
j=0
|σj |
d∑
i=0
(−1)i Ki
2d− i
(
min
{|δi/σi|})2d−i∆ dα1 . . . dαkdr1 . . . drkdx1 . . . dxd−1−2k
Corollary 3.3. The expected numbers of the internal equilibria and stable internal equilibria, E(d)
and SE(d), respectively, of a d-player two-strategy can be computed via
E(d) =
d−1∑
m=0
mpm, SE(d) =
1
2
d−1∑
m=0
mpm.
Note that these formulas are applicable for non-Gaussian distributions in contrast to the method
used in the previous section that can only be used for the Gaussian case.
Remark 3.4. In Theorem 3.2 for the case C1), the assumption that βk are standard Gaussians,
thus particularly have variance 1, is just for simplicity. Suppose that βk is Gaussian with mean
0 and variance η2. We show that the probability pm, for 0 ≤ m ≤ d − 1, does not depend on η.
In this case, the formula for p is given by (25) but with C being replaced by η2C. To indicate its
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dependence on η, we write pη. We use a change of variable a = ηa˜. Then
ad−1pη(aσ0, . . . , aσd−1) da = ηd−1a˜d−1
1
(
√
2piη)d
∏d−1
j=0
(
d− 1
j
) exp
− a˜22
d−1∑
j=0
σ2j(
d− 1
j
)2
 η da˜
= a˜d−1
1
(
√
2pi)d
∏d−1
j=0
(
d− 1
j
) exp
− a˜22
d−1∑
j=0
σ2j(
d− 1
j
)2
 da˜
= a˜d−1p1(a˜σ0, . . . , a˜σd−1),
from which we deduce that pm does not depend on η. Similarly for the other cases, the uniform
interval can be 12α [−α, α] for some α > 0.
In the following examples, we apply Theorem 3.2 to obtain explicit formulas for games with
small number of players (d = 3, 4). For illustration we consider the case of normal distributions,
i.e. the case C1). All formulas in these examples are executed using Mathematica.
3.3 Concrete examples
Example 3.1 (Three-player two-strategy games: d = 3).
1) One internal equilibria: p1 = p1,0,1. We have
m = 1, k = 0, σ0 = 1, σ1 = x1 + x2, σ2 = x1x2,∆ = |x2 − x1|
q(σ0, σ1, σ2) =
1(
1 + x21x
2
2 +
1
4 (x1 + x2)
2
)
3/2
|x2 − x1|
Substituting these values into (19) we obtain the probability that a three-player two-strategy
evolutionary game has 1 internal equilibria
p1 =
1
4pi
∫
R+
∫
R−
1(
1 + x21x
2
2 +
1
4 (x1 + x2)
2
)
3/2
|x2 − x1| dx1 dx2 = 0.5.
2) Two internal equilibria: p2 = p2,0,0. We have
m = 2, k = 0, σ0 = 1, σ1 = x1 + x2, σ2 = x1x2,∆ = |x2 − x1|
q(σ0, σ1, σ2) =
1(
1 + x21x
2
2 +
1
4 (x1 + x2)
2
)
3/2
|x2 − x1|
The probability that a three-player two-strategy evolutionary game has 2 internal equilibria
is
p2 =
1
8pi
∫
R2+
1(
1 + x21x
2
2 +
1
4 (x1 + x2)
2
)
3/2
|x2 − x1| dx1 dx2 ≈ 0.134148. (26)
3) None-internal equilibria: the probability that a three-player two-strategy evolutionary game
has none internal equilibria is p0 = 1− p1 − p2 ≈ 1− 0.5− 0.134148 = 0.365852.
Example 3.2 (Four-player two-strategy games: d = 4).
1) One internal equilibria: p1 = p1,0,2 + p1,2,0
We first compute p1,0,2. In this case,
m = 1, k = 0, σ0 = 1, σ1 = x1+x2+x3, σ2 = x1x2+x1x3+x2x3,∆ = |x2−x1| |x3−x1| |x3−x2|.
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Substituting these into (19) we get
p1,0,2 =
1
18pi2
∫
R−
∫
R−
∫
R+
(
1 +
(x1 + x2 + x3)
2
9
+
(x1x2 + x1x3 + x2x3)
2
9
+ (x1x2x3)
2
)−2
× |x2 − x1| |x3 − x1| |x3 − x2| dx1 dx2 dx3 ≈ 0.223128.
Next we compute p1,2,0. In this case,
m = 1, k = 1, σ0 = 1, σ1 = σ1(x1, r1e
iα1 , r1e
−iα1) = x1 + r1eiα1 + r1e−iα1 = x1 + 2r1 cos(α1),
σ2 = σ2(x1, r1e
iα1 , r1e
−iα1) = x1(r1eiα1 + r1e−iα1) + r21 = 2x1r1 cos(α1) + r
2
1,
σ3 = σ3(x1, r1e
iα1 , r1e
−iα1) = x1r21.
∆ = ∆(x1, r1e
iα1 , r1e
−iα1) = |r1eiα1 − x1||r1e−iα1 − x1||r1eiα1 − r1e−iα1 | = |r21 − 2x1r1 cos(α1) + x21||2r1 sin(α1)|.
Substituting these into (19) yields
p1,2,0 =
2
9pi2
∫
R+
∫
[0,pi]
∫
R+
r1
(
1 +
(x1 + 2r1 cos(α1))
2
9
+
(2x1r1 cos(α1) + r
2
1)
2
9
+ (x1r
2
1)
2
)−2
× |r21 − 2x1r1 cos(α1) + x21||2r1 sin(α1)| dx1dr1dα1da ≈ 0.260348.
Therefore, we obtain that
p1 = p1,0,2 + p1,2,0 ≈ 0.223128 + 0.260348 = 0.483476.
2) Two internal equilibria: p2 = p2,0,1
m = 2, k = 0, σ0 = 1, σ1 = x1 + x2 + x3, σ2 = x1x2 + x1x3 + x2x3, σ3 = x1x2x3,
∆ = |x2 − x1| |x3 − x1| |x3 − x2|
The probability that a four-player two-strategy evolutionary game has 2 internal equilibria is
p2 =
1
18pi2
∫
R+
∫
R+
∫
R−
(
1 +
(x1 + x2 + x3)
2
9
+
(x1x2 + x1x3 + x2x3)
2
9
+ (x1x2x3)
2
)−2
× |x2 − x1| |x3 − x1| |x3 − x2| dx1 dx2 dx3 ≈ 0.223128. (27)
3) Three internal equilibria: p3 = p3,0,0
m = 3, k = 0, σ0 = 1, σ1 = x1 + x2 + x3, σ2 = x1x2 + x1x3 + x2x3, σ3 = x1x2x3,
∆ = |x2 − x1| |x3 − x1| |x3 − x2|
The probability that a four-player two-strategy evolutionary game has 3 internal equilibria is
p3 =
1
54pi2
∫
R3+
(
1 +
(x1 + x2 + x3)
2
9
+
(x1x2 + x1x3 + x2x3)
2
9
+ (x1x2x3)
2
)−2
×|x2 − x1| |x3 − x1| |x3 − x2| dx1 dx2 dx3 ≈ 0.0165236.
4) None-internal equilibria: the probability that a four-player two-strategy evolutionary game has
none internal equilibria is: p0 = 1−p1−p2−p3 ≈ 1−0.483476−0.223128−0.0165236 = 0.276872.
4 Universal estimates for pm
In Section 3, we have derived closed formulas for the probability distributions pm(0 ≤ m ≤ d−
1) of the number of internal equilibria. However, it is computationally expensive to compute these
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probabilities using the closed formula since it involves complex multiple-dimensional integrals.
In this section, using Descartes’ rule of signs and combinatorial techniques, we provide universal
estimates for pm. Descartes’ rule of signs is a technique for determining an upper bound on
the number of positive real roots of a polynomial in terms of the number of sign changes in the
sequence formed by its coefficients. This rule has been applied to random polynomials before in
the literature [BP32]; however this paper only obtained estimates for the expected number of zeros
of a random polynomial.
Theorem 4.1 (Descartes’ rule of signs, see e.g., [Cur18]). Consider a polynomial of degree n,
p(x) = anx
n + . . . + a0 with an 6= 0. Let v be the number of variations in the sign of the
coefficients an, an−1, . . . , a0 and np be the number of real positive zeros. Then (v− np) is an even
non-negative integer.
We recall that an internal equilibria of a d-player two-strategy game is a positive root of the
polynomial P given in (1). We will apply Descartes’ rule of signs to find an upper bound for the
probability that a random polynomial have a certain number of positive roots. This is a problem
that is of interest in its own right and may have applications elsewhere; therefore we will first
study this problem for a general random polynomial of the form
p(y) :=
n∑
k=0
aky
k, (28)
and then apply it to the polynomial P . It turns out that the symmetry of {ak} will be the key:
the asymmetric case requires completely different treatment from the symmetry one.
4.1 Estimates of pm: symmetric case
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that the coefficients ak, 0 ≤ k ≤ n in the polynomial (28) are i.i.d and
symmetrically distributed. Let pk,n, 0 ≤ k ≤ n is the probability that the sequence of coefficients
(a0, . . . , an) have k changes of signs. Then
pk,n =
1
2n
(
n
k
)
. (29)
Proof. We take the sequence of coefficients (a0, . . . , an) and move from the left starting from a0 to
the right ending at an. When there is a change of sign, we write a 1 and write a 0 when there is
not. Then the changes of signs form a binary sequence of length n. There are totally 2n of them.
Thereby pk,n is the probability that there are exactly k numbers of 1 in the binary sequence. There
are
(
n
k
)
numbers of such sequence. Since {βk} are independent and symmetrically distributed,
each sequence has a probability 12n of occurring. From this we deduce (29).
The next two lemmas on the sum of binomial coefficients will be used later on.
Lemma 4.3. Let 0 ≤ k ≤ n be positive integers. Then it holds that
n∑
j=k
j:even
(
n
j
)
=
1
2
[
n−k∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
+ (−1)k
(
n− 1
k − 1
)]
and
n∑
j=k
j:odd
(
n
j
)
=
1
2
[
n−k∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
− (−1)k
(
n− 1
k − 1
)]
,
(30)
where it is understood that
(
n
j
)
= 0 if j < 0. In particular, for k = 0, we get
n∑
j=0
j:even
(
n
j
)
=
n∑
j=0
j:odd
(
n
j
)
= 2n−1. (31)
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Proof. Since
n∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
(−1)j = (1 + (−1))n = 0, we have
n∑
j=k
(
n
j
)
(−1)j = −
k−1∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
(−1)j
According to [DT17, Lemma 5.4]
k−1∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
(−1)j = (−1)k−1
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
.
Therefore,
n∑
j=k
(
n
j
)
(−1)j = (−1)k
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
,
or equivalently:
n∑
j=k
j: even
(
n
j
)
−
n∑
j=k
j: odd
(
n
j
)
= (−1)k
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
.
Define S¯k,n :=
n∑
j=k
(
n
j
)
and Sk,n :=
k∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
. Then using the property that
(
n
j
)
=
(
n
n− j
)
we
get S¯k,n = Sn−k,n and
n∑
j=k
j:even
(
n
j
)
=
1
2
[
S¯k,n + (−1)k
(
n− 1
k − 1
)]
=
1
2
[
Sn−k,n + (−1)k
(
n− 1
k − 1
)]
and
n∑
j=k
j:odd
(
n
j
)
=
1
2
[
S¯k,n − (−1)k
(
n− 1
k − 1
)]
=
1
2
[
Sn−k,n − (−1)k
(
n− 1
k − 1
)]
.
This finishes the proof of this Lemma.
The following lemma provides estimates on the sum of the first k binomial coefficients.
Lemma 4.4. Let n and 0 ≤ k ≤ n be positive integers. We have the following estimates [MS77,
Lemma 8 & Corollary 9, Chapter 10] and [GKM12]
2nH
(
k
n
)
√
8k
(
1− kn
) ≤ k∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
≤ δ2nH
(
k
n
)
if 0 ≤ k ≤ n
2
, and (32)
2n − δ2nH
(
k
n
)
≤
k∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
≤ 2n − 2
nH
(
k
n
)
√
8k
(
1− kn
) if n2 ≤ k ≤ n, (33)
where δ = 0.98 and H is the binary entropy function
H(s) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x). (34)
In addition, if n = 2n′ is even and 0 ≤ k ≤ n′, we also have the following estimate [LPV03,
Lemma 3.8.2]
k−1∑
j=0
(
2n′
j
)
≤ 22n′−1
(
2n′
k
)/(
2n′
n′
)
. (35)
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We now apply Proposition 4.2 and Lemmas 4.3-4.4 to derive estimates on the probability that
a d-player two-strategy evolutionary game has a certain number of internal equilibria. The main
theorem of this section is the following.
Theorem 4.5. Let pm, 0 ≤ m ≤ d − 1, be the probability that a d-player two-strategy has m
number of internal equilibria. The following assertions hold
(a) Upper-bound for pm, for all 0 ≤ m ≤ d− 1,
pm ≤ 1
2d−1
∑
j:j≥m
j−m even
(
d− 1
j
)
=
1
2d
[
d−1−m∑
j=0
(
d− 1
j
)
+
(
d− 2
m− 1
)]
(36)
≤

1
2d
[
δ2(d−1)H
(
m
d−1
)
+
(
d− 2
m− 1
)]
if d−12 ≤ m ≤ d− 1,
1
2d
[
2d−1 − 2(d−1)H
(
m
d−1
)
8m
(
1− md−1
) +( d− 2
m− 1
)]
if 0 ≤ m ≤ d−12 .
(37)
As consequences, 0 ≤ pm ≤ 12 for all 0 ≤ m ≤ d − 1, pd−1 ≤ 12d−1 , pd−2 ≤ d−12d−1 and
lim
d→∞
pd−1 = lim
d→∞
pd−2 = 0.
In addition, if d− 1 = 2d′ is even and 0 ≤ m ≤ d′ then
pm ≤ 1
2d
[
2d−2
(
d− 1
m− 1
)/(
d− 1
d′
)
+
(
d− 2
m− 1
)]
. (38)
(b) Lower-bound for p0 and p1:
p0 ≥ 1
2d−1
and p1 ≥ d− 1
2d−1
. (39)
(c) For d = 2: p0 = p1 =
1
2 .
(d) For d = 3: p1 =
1
2 .
Proof. (a) This part is a combination of Decartes’ rule of signs, Proposition 4.2 and Lemmas
4.3-4.4. In fact, as a consequence of Decartes’s rule of signs and by Proposition 4.2, we have
pm ≤
∑
j:j≥m
j−m: even
pj,d−1 =
1
2d−1
∑
j:j≥m
j−m: even
(
d− 1
j
)
,
which is the inequality part in (36). Next, applying Lemma 4.3 for k = m and n = d− 1 and then
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Lemma 4.4, we get
1
2d−1
∑
k:k≥m
k−m: even
(
d− 1
k
)
=

1
2d
[∑d−1−m
j=0
(
d− 1
j
)
+ (−1)m
(
d− 2
m− 1
)]
if m is even
1
2d
[∑d−1−m
j=0
(
d− 1
j
)
− (−1)m
(
d− 2
m− 1
)]
if m is odd
=
1
2d
[
d−1−m∑
j=0
(
d− 1
j
)
+
(
d− 2
m− 1
)]
≤

1
2d
[
δ2(d−1)H
(
m
d−1
)
+
(
d− 2
m− 1
)]
if d−12 ≤ m ≤ d− 1,
1
2d
[
2d−1 − 2(d−1)H
(
m
d−1
)
8m
(
1− md−1
) +( d− 2
m− 1
)]
if 0 ≤ m ≤ d−12 .
This proves the equality part in (36) and (37). For the consequences: the estimate pm ≤ 12 for all
0 ≤ m ≤ d − 1 is followed from (36) and (31); the estimates pd−1 ≤ 12d−1 and pd−2 ≤ d−12d−1 are
special cases of (36) for m = d− 1 and m = d− 2 respectively.
Finally, the estimate (38) is a consequence of (36) and (35).
(b) It follows from Decartes’ rule of signs and Proposition 4.2 that
p0 ≥ p0,d−1 = 1
2d−1
and p1 ≥ p1,d−1 = d− 1
2d−1
.
(c) For d = 2: from parts (a) and (b) we have
1
2
≤ p0, p1 ≤ 1
2
,
which implies that p0 = p1 =
1
2 as claimed.
(d) Finally, for d = 3: also from parts (a) and (b) we get
1
2
≤ p1 ≤ 1
2
,
so p1 =
1
2 . We finish the proof of the Theorem.
4.2 Estimates of pm: general case
In the proof of Proposition 4.2 the assumption that {ak} are symmetrically distributed is
crucial. Under this assumption, all 2n binary sequences constructed there are equally distributed
which results in a compact formula for pk,n. However, when {ak} are not symmetrically dis-
tributed, those binary sequences are no-longer equally distributed. Thus computing pk,n become
much more intricate. In this section, we will consider the general case where
P(ai > 0) = α, P(ai < 0) = 1− α for all i = 0, . . . , n.
We start with the following proposition that provides explicit formulas for pk,n for k ∈
{0, 1, n− 1, n}.
17
Proposition 4.6. The following formulas hold
• p0,n = αn+1 + (1− α)n+1, p1,n =
{
n
2n if α =
1
2 ,
2α(1− α) (1−α)n−αn1−2α if α 6= 12 ,
• pn−1,n =
nα
n
2 (1− α)n2 if n even
α
n+1
2 (1− α)n+12
[
n+1
2
(
α
1−α +
1−α
α
)
+ (n− 1)
]
if n odd.
and
• pn,n =
{
α
n
2 (1− α)n2 if n is even
2α
n+1
2 (1− α)n+12 if n is odd
In particular, if α = 12 , then p0,n = p1,n =
1
2n and p1,n = pn−1,n =
n
2n .
Proof. The four extreme cases k ∈ {0, 1, n−1, n} are special because we can characterise explicitly
the events that the sequence {a0, . . . , an} has k changes of signs. We have
p0,n = P{a0 > 0, . . . , an > 0}+P{a0 < 0, . . . , an < 0)}
= αn+1 + (1− α)n+1.
p1,n = P{∪n−1k=0{a0 > 0, . . . ak > 0, ak+1 < 0, . . . , an < 0} ∪ {a0 < 0, . . . ak < 0, ak+1 > 0, . . . , an > 0}}
=
n−1∑
k=0
(
αk+1(1− α)n−k + (1− α)k+1αn−k
)
= α(1− α)n
n−1∑
k=0
( α
1− α
)k
+ αn(1− α)
n−1∑
k=0
(1− α
α
)k
=

n
2n if α =
1
2 ,
α(1− α)n
1−
(
α
1−α
)n
1− α1−α + α
n(1− α)
1−
(
1−α
α
)n
1− 1−αα
if α 6= 12
=
{
n
2n if α =
1
2 ,
2α(1− α) (1−α)n−αn1−2α if α 6= 12 .
pn,n = P{{a0 > 0, a1 < 0, . . . , (−1)nan > 0} ∪ {a0 < 0, a1 > 0, . . . , (−1)nan < 0}}
=
{
α
n+2
2 (1− α)n2 + (1− α)n+22 αn2 if n is even
2α
n+1
2 (1− α)n+12 if n is odd
=
{
α
n
2 (1− α)n2 if n is even
2α
n+1
2 (1− α)n+12 if n is odd
It remains to compute pn−1,n.
pn−1,n =
n−1∑
k=0
P{ak and ak+1 have the same signs and there are n− 1 changes of signs in (a0, . . . , ak, ak+1, . . . , an)}
=:
n−1∑
k=0
γk.
We now compute γk. This depends on the parity of n and k. If both n and k are even, then
γk = P(a0 > 0, a1 < 0, . . . , ak > 0, ak+1 > 0, . . . an < 0) +P(a0 < 0, a1 > 0, . . . , ak < 0, ak+1 < 0, . . . an > 0)
= (1− α)n2 αn+22 + (1− α)n+22 αn2 .
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If n is even and k is odd, then
γk = P(a0 > 0, a1 < 0, . . . , ak < 0, ak+1 < 0, . . . an < 0) +P(a0 < 0, a1 > 0, . . . , ak > 0, ak+1 > 0, . . . an > 0)
= α
n+2
2 (1− α)n2 + (1− α)n+22 αn2 .
Therefore, in both cases, i.e., if n is even we get
γk = α
n
2 (1− α)n2 .
From this we deduce pn−1,n = nα
n
2 (1− α)n2 . Similarly if n is odd and k is even
γk = P(a0 > 0, a1 < 0, . . . , ak > 0, ak+1 > 0, . . . an > 0) +P(a0 < 0, a1 > 0, . . . , ak < 0, ak+1 < 0, . . . an < 0)
= (1− α)n+32 αn−12 + (1− α)n−12 αn+32 .
If both n and k are odd
γk = P(a0 > 0, a1 < 0, . . . , ak < 0, ak+1 < 0, . . . an > 0) +P(a0 < 0, a1 > 0, . . . , ak > 0, ak+1 > 0, . . . an < 0)
= α
n+1
2 (1− α)n+12 + (1− α)n+12 αn+12 .
Then when n is odd, we obtain
pn−1,n =
n+ 1
2
[
(1− α)n+32 αn−12 + (1− α)n−12 αn+32
]
+ (n− 1)αn+12 (1− α)n+12
= α
n+1
2 (1− α)n+12
[
n+ 1
2
( α
1− α +
1− α
α
)
+ (n− 1)
]
.
In conclusion,
pn−1,n =
nα
n
2 (1− α)n2 if n even
α
n+1
2 (1− α)n+12
[
n+1
2
(
α
1−α +
1−α
α
)
+ (n− 1)
]
if n odd.
The computations of pk,n for others k are more involved. We will employ combinatorial
techniques and derive recursive formulas for pk,n. We define
uk,n = P(there are k variations of signs in {a0, . . . , an}
∣∣an > 0) and
vk,n = P(there are k variations of signs in {a0, . . . , an}
∣∣an < 0).
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.7. The following recursive relations hold
uk,n = αuk,n−1 + (1− α)vk−1,n−1 and vk,n = αuk−1,n−1 + (1− α)vk,n−1. (40)
Proof. Applying the law of total probability P (A|B) = P (A|B,C)P (C|B) + P (A|B, C¯)P (C¯|B),
we have:
P(k sign switches in{a0, . . . , an}
∣∣an > 0)
= P(k sign switches in {a0, . . . , an}
∣∣an > 0, an−1 > 0)P(an−1 > 0|an > 0)
+P(k sign switches in {a0, . . . , an}
∣∣an > 0, an−1 < 0)P(an−1 < 0|an > 0).
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Since an−1 and an are independent, we have P(an−1 > 0
∣∣an > 0) = P(an−1 > 0) and P (an−1 <
0
∣∣an > 0) = P (an−1 < 0). Therefore,
P (k sign switches in {a0, . . . , an}
∣∣an > 0)
= P(k sign switches in {a0, . . . , an}
∣∣an > 0, an−1 > 0)P(an−1 > 0)
+P(k sign switches in {a0, . . . , an}
∣∣an > 0, an−1 < 0)P (an−1 < 0)
= P(k sign switches in {a0, . . . , an−1}
∣∣an−1 > 0)P(an−1 > 0)
+P(k − 1 sign switches in {a0, . . . , an−1}
∣∣an−1 < 0)P(an−1 < 0).
Therefore we obtain the first relationship in (40). The second one is proved similarly.
We can decouple the recursive relations in Lemma 4.7 to obtain recursive relations for {uk,n}
and vk,n separately.
Lemma 4.8. The following recursive relations hold
uk,n = α(1− α)(uk−2,n−2 − uk,n−2) + uk,n−1 and vk,n = α(1− α)(vk−2,n−2 − vk,n−2) + vk,n−1
(41)
Proof. From (40), it follows that
vk−1,n−1 =
uk,n − αuk,n−1
1− α , vk,n−1 =
uk+1,n − αuk+1,n−1
1− α (42)
Replace (42) to (40) we have
uk+1,n+1 − αuk+1,n
1− α = αuk−1,n−1 + (1− α)
uk+1,n − αuk+1,n−1
1− α
which implies that
uk+1,n+1 = (1− α)αuk−1,n−1 + (1− α)(uk+1,n − αuk+1,n−1) + αuk+1,n
= (1− α)αuk−1,n−1 − α(1− α)uk+1,n−1 + uk+1,n.
Re-indexing we get uk,n = (1−α)α(uk−2,n−2−uk,n−2)+uk,n−1. Similarly we obtain the recursive
formula for vk,n.
Using the recursive equations for uk,n and vk,n we can also derive a recursive relation for pk,n.
Proposition 4.9. {pk,n} satisfies the following recursive relation.
pk,n = α(1− α)(pk−2,n−2 − pk,n−2) + pk,n−1. (43)
Proof. From Lemmas 4.7 and 4.8 we have
pk,n = αuk,n + (1− α)vk,n
= α[α(1− α)(uk−2,n−2 − uk,n−2) + uk,n−1]
+ (1− α)[α(1− α)(vk−2,n−2 − vk,n−2) + vk,n−1]
= α(1− α)[α(uk−2,n−2 − uk,n−2) + (1− α)(vk−2,n−2 − vk,n−2)]
+ αuk,n−1 + (1− α)vk,n−1
= α(1− α)(pk−2,n−2 − pk,n−2) + pk,n−1.
This finishes the proof.
In the next main theorem we will find explicit formulas for pk,n from the recursive formula
in the previous lemma using the method of generating function. The case α = 12 will be a special
one.
20
Theorem 4.10. pk,n is given explicitly by: for α =
1
2 ,
pk,n =
1
2n
(
n
k
)
and for α 6= 12 ,
If k is even, k = 2k′, then
pk,n =

∑n
m=dn2 e
n−k+1
2m−n+1
(
m
k′, n− k′ −m, 2m− n
)
(−1)n−k′−m(α(1− α))n−m if n even,
∑n
m=dn2 e
n−k+1
2m−n+1
(
m
k′, n− k′ −m, 2m− n
)
(−1)n−k′−m(α(1− α))n−m
+2
(
dn−12 e
k′
)
(−1)dn−12 e−k′+1(α(1− α))n+12 if n odd.
If k is odd, k = 2k′ + 1, then
pk,n = 2
n∑
m=dn−12 e
(
m
k′, n− k′ −m− 1, 2m− n+ 1
)
(−1)n−k′−m−1(α(1− α))n−m.
Proof. Set 1/A2 := α(1 − α). By Cauchy-Schartz inequality α(1 − α) ≤ (α+1−α)24 = 14 , it follows
that A2 ≥ 4. Define ak,n := Anpk,n. Substituting this relation into (43) we get the following
recursive formula for ak,n
ak,n = ak−2,n−2 − ak,n−2 +Aak,n−1.
According to Proposition 4.6
a0,n = A
np0,n = A
n
(
αn+1 + (1− α)n+1
)
= α
( α
1− α
)n
2
+ (1− α)
(1− α
α
)n
2
, (44)
a1,n = A
np1,n =
{
n if α = 12
2α(1−α)
1−2α
[(
1−α
α
)n
2 − ( α1−α)n2 ]. (45)
Also ak,n = 0 for k > n. Let F (x, y) be the generating function of ak,n, that is
F (x, y) :=
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
n=0
ak,nx
kyn.
Define
g(x, y) =
∞∑
n=0
a0,ny
n +
∞∑
n=0
a1,nxy
n.
From (44)-(45) we have: for α = 12
g(x, y) =
∞∑
n=0
yn + xy
∞∑
n=0
nyn−1 =
1
1− y + xy
d
dy
( 1
1− y
)
=
1− y + xy
(1− y)2 ,
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and for α 6= 12
g(x, y) =
∞∑
n=0
[
α
( α
1− α
)n
2
+ (1− α)
(1− α
α
)n
2
]
yn +
2α(1− α)x
1− 2α
∞∑
n=1
[(1− α
α
)n
2 −
( α
1− α
)n
2
]
yn
=
[
α− 2α(1− α)x
1− 2α
] ∞∑
n=0
( α
1− α
)n
2
yn +
[
1− α+ 2α(1− α)x
1− 2α
] ∞∑
n=0
(1− α
α
)n
2
yn
=
[
α− 2α(1− α)x
1− 2α
] ∞∑
n=0
(αA)nyn +
[
1− α+ 2α(1− α)x
1− 2α
] ∞∑
n=0
((1− α)A)nyn
=
[
α− 2α(1− α)x
1− 2α
] 1
1− αAy +
[
1− α+ 2α(1− α)x
1− 2α
] 1
1− (1− α)Ay
=
(
α(1− 2α)− 2α(1− α)x
)(
1− (1− α)Ay
)
+
(
(1− α)(1− 2α) + 2α(1− α)x
)(
1− αAy
)
(1− 2α)(1− αy)(1− (1− α)Ay)
=
1− 2yA + 2xyA
1−Ay + y2 .
Note that in the above computations we have the following identities
1
A2
= α(1−α), α
1− α = (αA)
2,
1− α
α
= (1−α)2A2, (1−αAy)(1−(1−α)Ay) = 1−Ay+y2.
Now we have
F (x, y) =
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
n=0
ak,nx
kyn
= g(x, y) +
∞∑
k=2
∞∑
n=2
(ak−2,n−2 − ak,n−2 +Aak,n−1)xkyn
= g(x, y) +
∞∑
k=2
∞∑
n=2
ak−2,n−2xkyn −
∞∑
k=2
∞∑
n=2
ak,n−2xkyn +A
∞∑
k=2
∞∑
n=2
ak,n−1xkyn (46)
= g(x, y) + (I) + (II) + (III). (47)
We rewrite the sums (I), (II) and (III) as follow. For the first sum
(I) =
∞∑
k=2
∞∑
n=2
ak−2,n−2xkyn = x2y2
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
n=0
ak,nx
kyn = x2y2F (x, y).
For the second sum
(II) =
∞∑
k=2
∞∑
n=2
ak,n−2xkyn =
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
n=2
ak,n−2xkyn −
∞∑
n=2
a0,n−2yn −
∞∑
n=2
a1,n−2xyn
= y2
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
n=0
ak,nx
kyn − y2
∞∑
n=0
a0,ny
n − y2
∞∑
n=1
a1,nxy
n
= y2(F (x, y)− g(x, y)).
And finally for the last sum
(III) =
∞∑
k=2
∞∑
n=2
ak,n−1xkyn = y(F (x, y)− g(x, y)).
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Substituting these sums back into (47) we get
F (x, y) = g(x, y) + x2y2F (x, y)− y2(F (x, y)− g(x, y)) +Ay(F (x, y)− g(x, y)),
which implies that
F (x, y) =
g(x, y)(1−Ay + y2)
(1−Ay + y2 − x2y2) .
For α = 12 , we get
F (x, y) =
1− y + xy
(1− y)2
(1− y)2
(1− y)2 − x2y2 =
1
1− y − xy
=
∞∑
n=0
(1 + x)nyn
=
∞∑
n=0
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
xkyn,
which implies that αk,n =
(
n
k
)
. Hence for the case α = 12 , we obtain pk,n =
1
2n
(
n
k
)
.
For the case α 6= 12 we obtain
F (x, y) =
1− 2yA + 2xyA
1−Ay + y2
1−Ay + y2
1−Ay + y2 − x2y2 =
1− 2yA + 2xyA
1−Ay + y2 − x2y2 .
Finding the series expansion for this case is much more involved than the previous one. Using the
multinomial theorem we have
1
1−Ay + y2 − x2y2 =
∞∑
m=0
(x2y2 − y2 +Ay)m
=
∞∑
m=0
∑
0≤i,j,l≤m
i+j+l=m
(
m
i, j, l
)
(x2y2)i(−y2)j(Ay)l
=
∞∑
m=0
∑
0≤i,j,l≤m
i+j+l=m
(
m
i, j, l
)
(−1)jAlx2iy2i+2j+l
=
∞∑
m=0
∑
0≤i,l≤m
i+l≤m
(
m
i,m− i− l, l
)
(−1)m−i−lAlx2iy2m−l.
Therefore
F (x, y) =
1
A
(A− 2y + 2xy)
∞∑
m=0
∑
0≤i,l≤m
i+l≤m
(
m
i,m− i− l, l
)
(−1)m−i−lAlx2iy2m−l
=
∞∑
m=0
∑
0≤i,l≤m
i+l≤m
(
m
i,m− i− l, l
)
(−1)m−i−lAl−1
(
Ax2iy2m−l − 2x2iy2m−l+1 + 2x2i+1y2m−l+1
)
.
(48)
From this we deduce that:
If k is even, k = 2k′, then to obtain the coefficient of xkyn on the right-hand side of (48), we
select (i,m, l) such that
(i = k′ & 2m− l = n & 0 ≤ i, l ≤ m) or (i = k′ & 2m− l + 1 = n & 0 ≤ i, l ≤ m)
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Then we obtain
ak,n =
n∑
m=dn2 e
(
m
k′,m− k′ − (2m− n), 2m− n
)
(−1)m−k′−(2m−n)A2m−n
+ 2
n∑
m=dn−12 e
(
m
k′,m− k′ − (2m− n+ 1), 2m− n+ 1
)
(−1)m−k′−(2m−n+1)+1A2m−n
=
n∑
m=dn2 e
(
m
k′, n− k′ −m, 2m− n
)
(−1)n−k′−mA2m−n
+ 2
n∑
m=dn−12 e
(
m
k′, n− k′ −m− 1, 2m− n+ 1
)
(−1)n−k′−mA2m−n
=

∑n
m=dn2 e
[(
m
k′, n− k′ −m, 2m− n
)
+ 2
(
m
k′, n− k′ −m− 1, 2m− n+ 1
)]
(−1)n−k′−mA2m−n if n even
∑n
m=dn2 e
[(
m
k′, n− k′ −m, 2m− n
)
+ 2
(
m
k′, n− k′ −m− 1, 2m− n+ 1
)]
(−1)n−k′−mA2m−n
+2
(
dn−12 e
k′
)
(−1)dn−12 e−k′+1A−1 if n odd
=

∑n
m=dn2 e
n−k+1
2m−n+1
(
m
k′, n− k′ −m, 2m− n
)
(−1)n−k′−mA2m−n if n even
∑n
m=dn2 e
n−k+1
2m−n+1
(
m
k′, n− k′ −m, 2m− n
)
(−1)n−k′−mA2m−n
+2
(
dn−12 e
k′
)
(−1)dn−12 e−k′+1A−1 if n odd
Similarly, if k is odd, k = 2k′ + 1, then to obtain the coefficient of xkyn on the right-hand side of
(48), we select (i,m, l) such that
(i = k′ & 2m− l + 1 = n & 0 ≤ i, l ≤ m)
and obtain
ak,n = 2
n∑
m=dn−12 e
(
m
k′, n− k′ −m− 1, 2m− n+ 1
)
(−1)n−k′−m−1A2m−n.
From ak,n we compute pk,n using the relations pk,n =
ak,n
An and A
2 = 1α(1−α) and obtain the
claimed formulas. This finishes the proof of this theorem.
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Remark 4.11. We can find ak,n by establishing a recursive relation. We have
1
F (x, y)
=
1−Ay + y2 − x2y2
1− 2yA + 2xyA
= −Axy
2
− Ay
2
+
A2
4
+
1−A2/4
1− 2yA + 2xyA
= −Axy
2
− Ay
2
+
A2
4
+ (1−A2/4)
∞∑
n=0
(2y
A
(1− x)
)n
= −Axy
2
− Ay
2
+
A2
4
+ (1−A2/4)
∞∑
n=0
( 2
A
)n
(1− x)nyn
= −Axy
2
− Ay
2
+
A2
4
+ (1−A2/4)
∞∑
n=0
n∑
k=0
(−1)kCk,n
( 2
A
)n
xkyn
= 1 +
( 2
A
−A)y − 2
A
xy + (1−A2/4)
∞∑
n=2
n∑
k=0
(−1)kCk,n
( 2
A
)n
xkyn
=:
∞∑
n=0
n∑
k=0
bk,nx
kyn := B(x, y).
where
b0,0 = 1, b0,1 =
2
A
−A, b1,1 = − 2
A
and bk,n = (1−A2/4)(−1)kCk,n
( 2
A
)n
for 0 ≤ k ≤ n, n ≥ 2.
(49)
Using the relation that F (x, y)B(x, y) =
(∑∞
n=0
∑∞
k=0 ak,nx
kyn
)(∑∞
n′=0
∑∞
k′=0 bk′n′x
k′yn
′
)
= 1
we get the following recursive formula to determine aK,N
a0,0 =
1
b0,0
= 1, a0,N = −
N−1∑
n=0
a0,nb0,N−n, aK,N = −
K−1∑
k=0
N−1∑
n=0
ak,nbK−k,N−n.
It is not trivial to obtain an explicit formula from this recursive formula. However, it is easily
implemented using a computational software such as Mathematica or Mathlab.
Remark 4.12. Proposition 4.9 provides a second-order recursive relation for the probabilities
pn,k. This relation resembles the well-known Chu-Vandermonde identity for binomial coefficient,
bk,n :=
(
n
k
)
, which is for 0 < m < n
bk,n =
k∑
j=0
(
m
j
)
bk−j,n−m.
Particularly for m = 2 we obtain
bk,n = bk,n−2 + 2bk−1,n−2 + bk−2,n−2
= bk−2,n−2 − bk,n−2 + 2(bk,n−2 + bk−1,n−2)
= bk−2,n−2 − bk,n−2 + 2bk,n−1,
where the last identity is the Pascal’ rule for binomial coefficients.
On the other hand, the recursive formula pn,k for α =
1
2 becomes
pk,n =
1
4
(pk−2,n−2 − pk,n−2) + pk,n−1.
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Using the transformation ak,n :=
1
2n pk,n as in the proof of Theorem 4.10, then
ak,n = ak−2,n−2 − ak,n−2 + 2ak,n−1,
which is exactly the Chu-Vandermonde identity for m = 2 above. Then it is no surprising that in
Theorem 4.10 we obtain that ak,n is exactly the same as the binomial coefficient ak,n =
(
n
k
)
.
Example 4.1.
• n = 1 : p0,1 = α2 + (1− α)2; p1,1 = 2α(1− α);
• n = 2 : p0,2 = α3 + (1− α)3, p1,2 = 2α(1− α), p2,2 = α(1− α);
• n = 3 : p0,3 = α4 + (1− α)4, p1,3 = 2α(1− α)(α2 − α+ 1), p2,3 = 2α(1− α)(α2 − α+ 1), p3,3 = 2α2(1− α)2;
• n = 4 : p0,4 = α5 + (1− α)5, p1,4 = 2α(1− α)(2α2 − 2α+ 1), p2,4 = 3α(1− α)(2α2 − 2α+ 1),
p3,4 = 4α
2(1− α)2, p4,4 = α2(1− α)2.
Direct computations verify the recursive formula for k = 2, n = 4
p2,4 = α(1− α)(p0,2 − p2,2) + p2,3
We now apply Theorem 4.10 to the polynomial P to obtain estimates for pm, 0 ≤ m ≤ d− 1
which is the probability that a d-player two-strategy random evolutionary game has m internal
equilibria. This theorem extends Theorem 4.5 for α = 1/2 to the general case although we do not
get an explicit upper bound in terms of d as in Theorem 4.5.
Theorem 4.13. The following assertions hold
(i) Upper-bound for pm
pm ≤
∑
k≥m
k−m even
pk,d−1,
where pk,d−1 can be computed explicitly according to Theorem 4.10 with n replaced by d− 1.
(ii) Lower-bound for p0: p0 ≥ αd + (1− α)d ≥ 12d−1 ,
(iii) Lower-bound for p1: p1 ≥
{
d−1
2d−1 if α =
1
2 ,
2α(1− α) (1−α)d−1−αd−11−2α if α 6= 12 ,
(iv) Upper-bound for pd−2:
pd−2 ≤
(d− 1)α
d−1
2 (1− α) d−12 if d odd
α
d
2 (1− α) d2
[
d
2
(
α
1−α +
1−α
α
)
+ (d− 2)
]
if d even
≤ d− 1
2d−1
when d ≥ 3.
(v) Upper-bound for pd−1:
qd−1 ≤
{
α
d−1
2 (1− α) d−12 if d is odd
2α
d
2 (1− α) d2 if d is even ≤
1
2d−1
.
As consequences
(a) For d = 2: p0 = α
2 + (1− α)2 and p1 = 2α(1− α).
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(b) For d = 3, p1 = 2α(1− α).
Proof. We will apply Decartes’ rule of signs, Proposition 4.6 and 4.10 for the random polynomial
(5). It follows from Decartes’ rule of signs that
pm ≤
∑
k≥m
k−m even
pk,d−1,
where pk,d−1 is given explicitly in Theorem 4.10 with n replaced by d − 1. This proves the first
statement. In addition, we can also deduce from Decartes’ rule of signs and Proposition 4.6 the
following estimates for special cases m ∈ {0, 1, d− 2, d− 1}:
• p0 ≥ p0,d−1 = αd + (1− α)d ≥ min
0≤α≤1
[αd + (1− α)d] = 1
2d−1
,
• p1 ≥ p1,d−1 =
{
d−1
2d−1 if α =
1
2 ,
2α(1− α) (1−α)d−1−αd−11−2α if α 6= 12 ,
• pd−2 ≤ pd−2,d−1 =
(d− 1)α
d−1
2 (1− α) d−12 if d odd
α
d
2 (1− α) d2
[
d
2
(
α
1−α +
1−α
α
)
+ (d− 2)
]
if d even.
=
{
(d− 1)(α(1− α)) d−12 if d odd
d
2 (α(1− α))d/2−1 − 2(α(1− α))d/2 =: d2βd/2−1 − 2βd/2 =: f(β) if d even
≤
{
(d− 1)(1/4) d−12 = d−1
2d−1 if d odd
max0≤β≤ 14 f(β) =
d−1
2d−1 if d ≥ 3 even
where to obtain the last inequality, we have used the fact that
0 ≤ β = α(1− α) ≤ 1
4
and f ′(β) = dβd/2−2
(d
4
− 1
2
− β
)
≥ 0 when 0 ≤ β ≤ 1
4
and d ≥ 3.
• pd−1 ≤ pd−1,d−1 =
{
α
d−1
2 (1− α) d−12 if d is odd
2α
d
2 (1− α) d2 if d is even
≤
{
(1/4)
d−1
2 = 1
2d−1 if d is odd
2(1/4)
d
2 = 1
2d−1 if d is even.
This finishes the proof of the estimates (ii) − (v). For the consequences: for d = 2, in this case
the above estimates (ii)− (v) respectively become:
p0 ≥ α2 + (1− α)2, p1 ≥
{
1
2 if α =
1
2 ,
2α(1− α) if α 6= 12
= 2α(1− α)
and p0 ≤ α(1− α)
[ α
1− α +
1− α
α
]
= α2 + (1− α)2, q1 ≤ 2α(1− α).
which imply that p0 = α
2 + (1− α)2, p1 = 2α(1− α).
Similarly for d = 3, estimates (ii) and (iii) respectively become
p1 ≥
{
1
2 if α =
1
2 ,
2α(1− α)if α 6= 12
= 2α(1− α), and p1 ≤ 2α(1− α)
from which we deduce that p1 = 2α(1− α).
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5 Numerical simulations
In this section, we perform several numerical (sampling) simulations and calculations to illus-
trate the analytical results obtained in the previous sections. Figure 1 shows the values of pm for
different values of d, for the three cases studied in Theorem 3.2, i.e., when βk are i.i.d. standard
normally distributed (GD), uniformly distributed (UD1) and when βk = ak − bk with ak and
βk being uniformly distributed (UD2). We compare results obtained from analytical formulas in
Theorem 3.2 and from samplings. The figure shows that they are in accordance with each other
agreeing at least 2 digits after the decimal points.
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Figure 1: Probability of having a certain number (m) of internal equilibria, pm, for different values
of d. The payoff entries ak and bk were drawn from a Gaussian distribution with variance 1 and
mean 0 (GD) and from a standard uniform distribution (UD2). We also study the case where
βk = ak − bk itself is drawn from a standard uniform distribution (UD1). Results are obtained
from analytical formulas (Theorem 1.2) (panel a) and are based on sampling 106 payoff matrices
where payoff entries are drawn from the corresponding distributions. Analytical and simulations
results are in accordance with each other. All results are obtained using Mathematica.
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6 Further discussions and future research
In this paper, we have provided closed formulas and universal estimates for the probability
distribution of the number of internal equilibria in a d-player two-strategy random evolutionary
game. We have explored further connections between the evolutionary game theory and the
random polynomial theory as discovered in our previous works [DH15, DH16, DTH17a]. We
believe that the results reported in the present work open up a new exciting avenue of research
in the study of equilibrium properties of random evolutionary games. We now provide further
discussions on these issues and possible directions for future research.
Computations of probabilities pm. Although we have found analytical formulas for pm it is
computationally challenging to deal with them because of their complexity. Obtaining an effective
computational method for pm would be an interesting problem for future investigation.
Mean-field approximation theory. Consider a general polynomial P as given in (7) with
dependent coefficients, and let Pm([a, b], n) be the probability that P has m real roots in the
interval [a, b] (recall that n is the degree of the polynomial, which is equal to d − 1 in Equation
(1)). The mean-field theory in [SM08] neglects the correlations between the real roots and simply
consider that these roots are randomly and independently distributed on the real axis with some
local density f(t) at a point t where f(t) being the density that can be computed from the
Edelman-Kostlan theorem [EK95]. Within this approximation in the large n limit, the probability
Pm([a, b], n) is given by a non-homogeneous Poisson distribution, see [SM08, Section 3.2.2 &
Equation (70)],
Pm([a, b], n) ≈ µ
m
m!
e−µ where µ =
∫ b
a
f(t) dt. (50)
Now let us apply this theory to approximate the probability pm that a random d-player two-
strategy evolutionary game has m internal equilibria. Suppose that βk are i.i.d. normal Gaussians,
then, for large d, pm can be approximated by
pm ≈ E(d)
m
m!
e−E(d),
where E(d) is the expected number of internal equilibria. According to [DTH17a], for large d, we
have E(d) ∼
√
2d−1
2 . Therefore, we obtain the following approximate formula for pm for large d,
pm ≈ 1
m!
(√2d− 1
2
)m
e−
√
2d−1
2 . (51)
This formula is simple and can be easily computed; however, it is unclear to us how to quantify
the errors of approximation since we do not have an efficient method to compute pm when d is
large, see the first point of this section. We leave this topic for future research.
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